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Under certain circumstances, a court may order a criminal defendant
to submit to a pretrial psychiatric examination.' Whether such an
examination constitutes a critical stage in the prosecutorial proceedings,2
triggering the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel,8 has never
been decided by the United States Supreme Court.4 Moreover, lower
court decisions which have addressed this issue have failed to develop a
consistent analysis and have reached contradictory results.5
This comment will begin with a review of the sixth amendment's
guarantee of the right to counsel to an accused criminal.0 Following a
discussion of United States v. Wade 7-a decision in which the United
States Supreme Court formulated the analysis for determining whether
a given pretrial confrontation constitutes a critical stage in the prosecu-
torial proceedings giving rise to a sixth amendment right to counsel s
state and federal court decisions involving court-ordered psychiatric
1. Such an examination most often comes about when a criminal defend-
ant presents an insanity defense, i.e., (1) that he is either "unable to under-
stand the proceedings against him or to assist his counsel in preparing his
defense and is thus incompetent to stand trial;" or (2) that "he was insane
at the time of the offense, and therefore lacked the requisite mental state to
be held criminally responsible." Comment, Miranda on the Couch: An Ap-
proach to Problems of Self-Incrimination, Right to Counsel, and Miranda
Warnings in Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examinations of Criminal Defendants, 11
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 403, 406-06 (1975). For a more detailed discussion of
the procedural process attending pretrial psychiatric examinations, see id. at
405-10.
2. For a discussion of the relationship between critical stages in the
prosecutorial proceedings and the sixth amendment, see notes 11-30 and ac-
companying text infra.
3. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution reads in per-
tinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. On October 8, 1980, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on the
related issue of whether a capital murder defendant must be advised, inter
alia, of a right to be assisted by counsel in deciding whether to submit to
examination by a psychiatrist. Estelle v. Smith, No. 79-1127, argument re-
ported, 49 U.S.L.W. 3454 (Dec. 23, 1980). See Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 926 (1980).
5. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 31-94 and accompanying text
infra.
6. See notes 11-21 and accompanying text infra.
7. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8. Id. at 227. See notes 22-30 and accompanying text infra.
(135)
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examinations will be reviewed.9 This comment will then apply the
Wade test to the facts of those cases and suggest that, under the sixth
amendment, an accused in such situations is entitled to the presence
of counsel.10
II. BACKGROUND
The fundamental purpose of the sixth amendment is to guarantee
a fair trial to one accused of a crime.1' To that end, the sixth amend-
ment guarantees that "the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 12 The Supreme Court has,
over time, interpreted the sixth amendment right to counsel as attaching
to all "critical stages of the prosecutorial proceedings," 13 that is, those
at which the presence of counsel is necessary to assure a meaningful
defense and to preserve the right of the accused to cross-examine wit-
niesses against him.
1 4
It is beyond dispute that the trial itself,15 as well as any other post-
indictment proceeding or "hearing" at which the defendant's case may
suffer prejudice, 16 are critical stages to which the right to counsel at-
9. See notes 33-94 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 95-181 and accompanying text infra.
11. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 223-24. See Comment, An His-
torical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73
YALE L.J. 1000, 1034 (1964). "[Counsel] has served to overcome the original
unfairness of the balance of state against individual." Id. at 1034.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. In recognition of the role of
pretrial confrontations between the prosecutor and accused in modern crim-
inal proceedings, the Wade Court stated that it has, over time, "construed
the sixth amendment guarantee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings,"
finding support for this construction in the words of the amendment which
guarantee the accused the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." Id. at 224-25, quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis by the
Court). For a more complete extract of the pertinent parts of the sixth
amendment, see note 3 supra.
14. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
15. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-45 (1963) (the right
of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel
is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 66 (1932) (the sixth amendment provides that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to counsel for his defense).
16. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (incriminating
statements by the defendant should have been excluded from evidence when
it appeared that they were overheard by federal agents, who, without notice
to the defendant's lawyer, arranged a meeting between the defendant and an
accomplice-turned informant); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)
(counsel required at state arraignment proceedings at which certain rights
might be sacrificed or lost).
,In focusing on the definition of "critical stage," the period from arraign-
ment to trial has been termed " 'perhaps the most critical period of the pro-
ceedings . . . ' during which the accused 'requires the guiding hand of coun-
sel . . . ' if the guarantee is not to prove an empty right." United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 225, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)
(citations omitted).
[VOL. 26: p. 135
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss1/4
COMMENTS
taches. Similarly, it is clear that the right to counsel attaches to any
custodial interrogation of a criminal suspect.17 On the other hand, the
Court has made clear that neither the sixth amendment right to counsel,
nor the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 8 applies
where the defendant is siiaply being made the source of "real or physical
evidence," 19 as when he is required to provide handwriting exemplars 21
or to submit to a blood test.21 The issues, then, are to what situations
falling between these two extremes does the right to counsel attach and
what is the proper analysis with which to make that decision.
In United States v. Wade, the Supreme Court was faced with the
question of whether a criminal defendant, indicted on bank robbery
charges, had been denied his sixth amendment right to counsel, when,
without notice to his attorney, the defendant was placed in a police
lineup.22 The Court viewed the principles of prior cases as requiring
17. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-91 (1966) (the prosecution
may not use statements at trial stemming from questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody, or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in a significant way, unless certain procedural safe-
guards are complied with, including telling the defendant of his right to have
counsel present); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (when an
investigation has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been
taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, and the suspect has re-
quested and been denied the opportunity to consult with his lawyer, he has
been denied his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel).
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." Id.
19. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 223, quoting Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Court explained that both federal and state
courts have usually held that the privilege offers no protection against com-
pulsion to submit to the production of physical evidence such as fingerprinting,
photography, measurements and handwriting or speech identifications and
that such acts did not fall under the fifth amendment privilege merely because
they were required of the accused in a pre-trial lineup. 388 U.S. at 223.
20. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967) (the taking of
handwriting exemplars does not violate a suspect's constitutional rights, since
it does not constitute a compulsory communication protected by the fifth
amendment and is not a critical stage of the prosecutorial proceedings which
entitles a suspect to the presence of counsel).
21. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (the taking of a blood
sample from a suspect for purposes of determining his blood/alcohol level
does not violate the fifth amendment since there is no compulsion directed
at the suspect to testify against himself or to otherwise provide the state with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature).
22. 388 U.S. at 220. Several weeks after his indictment for bank robbery,
Wade was placed in a lineup in which all the participants wore strips of tape
across their faces, as the bank robber allegedly had done; and, upon direction,
each person repeated words similar to those used by the bank robber. Id.
The only persons present in the bank at the time of the robbery, two em-
ployees, identified Wade at the lineup as the bank robber. Id. At Wade's
trial, the court received the testimony of the witnesses to the robbery who
had identified the defendant at the lineup and who had re-identified him in
1980-1981]
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that it "scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine-
whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defend-
ant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to
cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance
of counsel at the trial itself." 23 The Court announced that the scrutiny
should involve an analysis of "whether potential substantial prejudice
to the defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and
the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice," 24 and held that the
defendant had a sixth amendment right to have his attorney present at
the lineup.25 The Court reasoned that the presence of counsel at critical
confrontations, as at trial, "operates to assure that the accused's interests
will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal
procedure." 26
In analyzing the Wade lineup for the presence of potential substan-
tial prejudice, the Court looked at the dangers of suggestion and in-
court. Id. The defendant was convicted. Id. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit granted a new trial. Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557,
560 (5th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In reversing the trial court,
the Fifth Circuit held that the "lineup, held as it was in the absence of coun-
sel, already chosen to represent appellant, was a violation of [appellant's]
Sixth Amendment rights .... ." 358 F.2d at 560. A new trial was ordered in
which the in-court identification evidence was to be excluded. Id. The
United States Supreme Court, in reviewing the grant of a new trial by the
Fifth Circuit, reversed and remanded with a direction to enter a new judgment
vacating the conviction and remanding the case to the district court. 388
U.S. at 221.
23. 388 U.S. at 227 (emphasis supplied by the Court). The Supreme Court
in Wade began its analysis by rejecting the contention that the lineup vio-
lated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
reasoning that, because the exhibiting of physical characteristics did not in-
volve a compulsion to give information of a testimonial nature, the privilege
was not violated. Id. at 221-23. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text
supra.
In considering the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel during a
lineup, the Court reviewed the historical basis of the sixth amendment and
explained that the framers of the Bill of Rights envisioned a broader role
for counsel than that prevailing in England at the time of the adoption of
the Bill of Rights under which counsel merely advised clients in "matters of
law" and eschewed any responsibility for "matters of fact." 388 U.S. at 224.
At least 11 of the 13 original state constitutions expressly abolished this dis-
tinction. Id. The Wade Court stated: "[T]he colonists appreciated that if a
defendant were forced to stand alone against the state, his case was fore-
doomed." Id., quoting Comment, supra note 11, at 1033-34. The Court
contrasted the law enforcement machinery existing in the colonies, under
which "the accused confronted the prosecutor and witnesses against him, and
the evidence was marshalled, largely at the trial itself," with that of today,
which "involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at
pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused's fate and
xeduce the trial itself to a mere formality." 388 U.S. at 224.
24. 388 U.S. at 227.
25. Id. at 236-37.
26. Id. at 227.
[VOL. 26: p. 135-
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fluence inherent in the lineup procedure 27 and concluded that "there
is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup,
which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial .... ,, 28 The
Court further concluded that, since the presence of counsel could help
avert that prejudice,29 the post-indictment lineup constituted a critical
stage of the prosecution at which the defendant was entitled to counsel.
80
Since Wade, of the six federal courts of appeals that have addressed
the issue, none has held that there is a constitutional right to counsel
during court-ordered psychiatric examinations.31 Their reasoning, how-
ever, has been either unarticulated or inconsistent.8 2  The Fourth
Circuit, in United States v. Albright,33 relying on a fifth amendment
27. Id. at 228-36. In discussing the dangers of suggestion and prejudice
in a lineup, the Wade Court stated:
neither witnesses nor lineup participants are apt to be alert for condi-
tions prejudicial to the suspect. And if they were, it would likely
be of scant benefit to the suspect since neither witnesses nor lineup
participants are likely to be schooled in the detection of suggestive
influences. Improper influences may go undetected by a suspect,
guilty or not, who experiences the emotional tension which we might
expect in one being confronted with potential accusers. Even when
he does observe abuse, if he has a criminal record he may be re-
luctant to take the stand and open up the admission of prior convic-
tions. Moreover, any protestations by the suspect of the fairness of
the lineup made at trial are likely to be in vain; the jury's choice
is between the accused's unsupported version and that of the police
officers present.
Id. at 230-31 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 236.
29. Id. The Court suggested that the attorney, as opposed to the defend-
ant, was better able to "ferret out suggestive influences in the secrecy of the
confrontation." Id. at 234-35. The Court noted as an example of such
influences that it is, for example, "not unknown for the identifying witness
to be placed in a position where he can see the suspect before the [lineup
forms].... ." Id. at 234 n.24, quoting Napley, Problems of Effecting the
Presentation of the Case for a Defendant, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 99 (1966).
30. 388 U.S. at 237. For further discussion of Wade, see Comment, The
Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts, 36
U. CHi. L. REv. 830 (1969); Note, Criminal Procedure-Right to Counsel at
Lineup Proceedings-Admissibility of Eye-Witness Identifications at a Lineup,
14 Loy. L. REv. 222 (1968); Note, Criminal Law: Self-Incrimination: Right
to Counsel, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 191 (1968).
31. See notes 33-55 and accompanying text infra.
32. Id.
33. 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968). In Albright, the defendant was brought
to trial on charges of forging and uttering United States postal money orders
with intent to defraud. Id. at 721. On the first day of trial, Albright's counsel
announced that the defendant would interpose insanity as a defense. Id. Since
no question of insanity had been raised previously, the court ordered a recess
of the trial and ordered the defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination.
Id. At trial, in support of his insanity plea, the defendant presented expert
testimony from a psychiatrist. Id. The government presented, as a rebuttal
witness, another psychiatrist whose testimony controverted that of the defense's
psychiatrist. Id. Albright was subsequently found guilty. Id.
-1980-1981]
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argument, 34 rejected the right to counsel claim without analysis of sixth
amendment considerations.35 The Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Smith,36 did not consider a court-ordered pretrial psychiatric examina-
tion to be an adversary confrontation 87 and did not mention Wade in
its review of the fairness of the examination.38
34. Id. at 719-27.
85. Id. at 719. On appeal, one of Albright's assertions was that his right
to counsel had been abridged because his attorney was not allowed to be present
during the course of the court-ordered psychiatric examination. Id. In affirm-
ing the trial court's guilty verdict, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the conclusion
of a pre-Wade state court decision which had held that a "defendant had no
federal or state constitutional right to have his attorney present during a psy-
chiatric examination conducted at the instance of the prosecutor." Id. at 726,
citing State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965). For a discussion of
Whitlow, see notes 69-71 and accompanying text infra. The Albright court
termed the nature of a psychiatric examination "intimate and personal" and
on this basis was "satisfied that, except in the unusual case, the presence of a
third party, in a legal and non-medical capacity, would severely limit the
efficacy of the examination, and that if the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination is given full effect with regard to his inculpatory statements to
his examiner, the need for the presence of a third party is obviated." 388 F.2d
at 726. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit found no error in the failure to
permit Albright's counsel to be present during the court-ordered psychiatric
examination. Id. at 726-27.
36. 436 F.2d 787 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971). In Smith,
the defendant was charged with passing forged postal money orders. Id. at
789. He admitted every element of the crime except willfully cashing the
money order and to this element raised the defense of insanity. Id. After his
arrest, the defendant was transported from jail to a hospital to be interviewed
by a psychiatrist. Id. During the 45 minute interview, Smith was restrained
by leg and hand chains and accompanied by a deputy marshall and guard. Id.
Smith was convicted by a jury and appealed to the Fifth Circuit, complaining,
inter alia, that the psychiatric examination had been unfair. Id.
37. 436 F.2d at 789-90. The court of appeals found that the trial court's
ordering of guards and chains did not result in an unfair examination or an
erroneous result, since psychiatrists, in the court's opinion, are undoubtedly
"less likely than jurors to permit their judgments to be influenced by [such]
measures." Id. The court did not discuss the possibility that the presence of
guards interfered with the rapport between the psychiatrist and defendant and
thus had diminished the effectiveness of the psychiatric evaluation. See id. at
787-91. Other courts have argued that the presence of any third party during
a psychiatric examination, including that of an attorney, is disruptive. See
note 85 supra; notes 38 & 50 infra.
38. 436 F.2d at 787-90. The court summarily dismissed the defendant's
argument that he had a right to counsel during the examination without men-
tioning either the fifth or sixth amendment. Id. at 790. The court charac-
terized the psychiatric examination as non-adversarial and explained that, since
no inculpatory statements made to the psychiatrist were admissible at trial,
counsel's presence during the examination was not needed. Id.
The Fifth Circuit more specifically addressed and summarily rejected the
fifth amendment-based claim of right to counsel during psychiatric examinations
in United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855
(1976). The defendant in Cohen argued that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination had been violated when, after he announced that he
intended to rely on the insanity defense, the trial court ordered him to submit
to examination by two government-selected psychiatrists. 530 F.2d at 47. Cohen
also contended that the court had denied him his right to counsel by refusing
his request to have counsel present at the examinations. Id. The Fifth Circuit
6
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Three circuits, however, have recognized the Wade reasoning as
setting forth a standard by which to determine the necessity for the
presence of counsel at pretrial confrontations, but have differed in their
application and elaboration of that standard. The Third Circuit, in
Stukes v. Shovlin,3 9 faced this issue in its consideration of a federal
habeas corpus appeal, 40 and, without announcing its own reasoning,
agreed "with the well-reasoned analysis of the district court, which con-
cluded that the psychiatric examination was not a 'critical stage' in the
constitutional sense, requiring the presence of counsel." 41
once again did not expressly discuss sixth amendment considerations but, in
rejecting the fifth amendment argument for presence of counsel, explained that
presence of an attorney might defeat the purpose of the examination and that
the examination was not the kind of "critical stage at which assistance of
counsel is needed or even useful." Id. at 48. The court's only elaboration on
this conclusion was that there was no need for counsel to instruct the accused
not to answer questions for fear of self-incrimination, for, in the court's opinion,
any such responses would be subject to suppression at trial. Id. Furthermore,
the court considered improper any interference with the examination beyond
advising the defendant not to answer. Id. Although the Fifth Circuit's holding
and rationale in Cohen were directed at fifth amendment considerations only,
the court used the term "critical stage"-a term most often used in sixth amend-
ment analysis-and cited without comment decisions of other circuits which had
addressed the right to counsel at psychiatric examinations in the sixth amend-
ment context. Id. at 48 nn.15 g. 16. For a discussion of the "critical stages"
analysis, see notes 11-30 supra.
39. 464 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1972). In Stukes, while the defendant was in
custody pending trial, he was subjected to an "ex parte" psychiatric examina-
tion, ordered by the state court of common pleas, to determine his competency
to stand trial. Id. at 1214.
40. See United States ex rel. Stukes v. Shovlin, 329 F. Supp. 911, 912 (E.D.
Pa. 1971). Following his state court conviction for murder, the defendant
sought and was denied habeas corpus relief from the federal district court. Id.
at 911-19. The district court reviewed Wade's mandate that trial courts scruti-
nize any pretrial confrontation to determine whether the presence of counsel
is necessary to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 913. For a
discussion of Wade, see notes 22-30 and accompanying text supra. The district
court found that, in the context of psychiatric examinations, the absence of
counsel "involves only a minimal risk to a defendant's right to a fair trial ...
because of the nature of a psychiatric examination" and because of what it
concluded to be "the limited role which counsel can play in employing his
legal skills to protect the accused's rights." 329 F. Supp. at 913. The court
further found a "strong analogy" to "purely scientific" tests such as fingerprint
analysis and blood sampling, in which counsel's role is limited to testing the
accuracy of medical conclusions, and concluded that counsel's physical presence
during the psychiatric examination is unnecessary. Id. The court went on to
hold that, on the facts of Stukes, counsel's absence had not precluded mean-
ingful cross-examination of the psychiatrist at trial. Id. at 913-14. Moreover,
the court explained that, since neither the psychiatrist nor his reports were
introduced at trial as evidence of criminal responsibility, this distinguished
psychiatric examinations from the Wade lineup situation. Id. at 914.
41. 464 F.2d at 1213, quoting United States ex rel. Stukes v. Shovlin, 329
F. Supp. 911, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The court did note, however, its position
that critical stages are "those links in the prosecutorial chain of events in which
the potential for incrimination inheres or at which the opportunity for effective
defense must be seized or foregone." 464 F.2d at 1213 n.5, quoting Reed v.
Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1972) (en banc). Apparently relying on
1980-1981]
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In United States v. Baird,42 the convicted defendant relied on Wade
in asserting that the denial of his request for the presence of counsel at
his psychiatric examination violated his sixth amendment rights. 4 3 On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding Wade to be
inapplicable on the grounds that the psychiatric examination was not a
"prosecutorial confrontation" at which the presence of counsel would be-
either necessary or helpful,44 that there was no impairment of defense
counsel's ability to cross-examine the psychiatrist at trial,45 and that no
other reasonable probability of prejudice existed.
46
a narrow reading of "prosecutorial," the court concluded that the examination
in Stukes was not ordered by the prosecution and was therefore not part of the
prosecutorial chain of events. See 464 F.2d at 1213 n.5.
42. 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970). In
Baird, the defendant was charged with and convicted of failure to file federal
income tax returns. 414 F.2d at 702. At trial, he defended on the basis, inter
alia, that "during the years in question, he lacked the capacity either to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law by reason of a mental disease or defect." Id. In presenting
its argument concerning criminal responsibility, the defense relied primarily on
psychiatrists who testified to the defendant's inability to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his conduct and to conform that conduct to the income tax laws.
Id. at 703-04. During trial, and at the request of the prosecution, the trial court
ordered the defendant to submit to an examination by an alienist (psychiatrist).
Id. at 705. The scope of the government psychiatrist's testimony was to be
limited to the issue of criminal responsibility and anything said by the defend-
ant bearing on guilt or innocence was not to be repeated in the psychiatrist's
testimony. Id. Prior to examination by the government's alienist, the defend-
ant had requested that his counsel be present, or that a stenographer transcribe
the interview. Id. at 711. These requests were denied, but the court ordered
that a copy of the government alienist's report be given to the defense counsel.
Id.
43. 414 F.2d at 711. Baird also asserted a violation of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination which was also rejected by the court. Id. at
706-10.
44. Id. at 711. The court determined that the psychiatric interview con-
ducted was not the kind of pre-trial prosecutorial confrontation dealt with in
Wade in that it was not part of the "investigative and identification process,
preceding arrest, aimed at ferreting out the guilty, suffused with the risk of
police abuse and possibility of implicating the innocent." Id. at 711-12.
45. Id. at 711. The court explained that in Wade, the decision had rested
in part on a possible impairment of the defendant's sixth amendment right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him, but in Baird the right of cross-
examination was protected since defense counsel was skilled in the presentation
of psychiatric testimony and had access to the notes of the government expert.
Id.
46. Id. at 712. The court considered Baird to be further distinguishable
from Wade based on the fact that the defendant in Baird had brought about
the confrontation deliberately and on his own by raising the defense of mental
incompetency. Id. The court also stated that there "is not moreover, the
widespread distrust of psychiatric examinations that there is of eye-witness
identifications made under marginal circumstances of reliability, nor does the
psychiatric interview have the inculpatory impact of a police line-up or
show-up." Id.
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Baird without discussion in
United States v. Trapnell, 495 F.2d 22 (1974). Later, in 1978, the court held,
[VOL. 26: p. 135
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Similarly, in Wax v. Pate,47 the Seventh Circuit held that the
presence of counsel was not constitutionally mandated under Wade in
the absence of a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant.4 8 The
court observed, however, that the "better practice is to [at least] notify
counsel of the examination," 49 and subsequently approved, in a fifth
amendment case,50 a rule leaving to the discretion of the trial court
the issue of the presence of counsel during such examinations. 51 Finally,
in Thornton v. Corcoran,52 the District of Columbia Circuit refused the
defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering counsel's access to
in Hollis v. Smith, that the Baird holding and rationale were applicable as
well to post-conviction psychiatric examinations conducted for purposes of
determining an appropriate sentence. 571 F.2d 685, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1978).
47. 409 F.2d 498, 499 (7th Cir. 1969). In Wax v. Pate, while the defendant
was confined in the county jail awaiting trial on charges of murder, he sub-
mitted to a court-ordered psychiatric examination conducted in the absence of,
and without notice to, his counsel. Id. The defendant raised the defense of
insanity at trial. Id. The examining psychiatrist testified that the defendant
was sane and the defendant was subsequently convicted of murder. Id. The
state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the state Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id.
The federal district court denied the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and, on appeal from that decision, the Seventh Circuit considered
whether the psychiatric examination, conducted at the request of the prosecu-
tion by a prosecution-designated psychiatrist, was a critical stage of the pro-
ceedings such that notice to and presence of counsel was a constitutional
requirement under the Wade standard. Id. at 499.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971). On the issue of
the right to the presence of counsel under the fifth amendment, the Seventh
Circuit quoted United States v. Albright in finding that the presence of a
non-medical third party in a legal capacity might interfere with the examina-
tion, and that, if a defendant's rights against self-incrimination are otherwise
preserved, the presence of an attorney at the examination is obviated. Id. at
67. For a discussion of Albright, see notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
51. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 67 (7th Cir. 1971). On the facts
before it, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. Id.
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the position taken in Bohle in United
States v. Green, 497 F.2d 1068, 1081 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
409 (1975). The court again focused solely on fifth amendment considerations
and did not mention right to counsel under the sixth amendment. 497 F.2d
at 1081-82.
52. 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Thornton, the defendant, after
being bound over to the grand jury on a complaint charging him with rape,
requested a preindictment psychiatric examination under a provision of the
District of Columbia code. 407 F.2d at 696. See D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301(a)
(1973). The district court ordered the defendant to be committed to a psychi-
atric hospital for 60 days for an examination to determine both competency
to stand trial and whether the defendant was suffering from a mental illness
at the time of the alleged offense. 407 F.2d at 696. During the period of the
commitment, the defendant requested that the district court order the hospital
to permit his counsel and an independent psychiatrist to be present at a hos-
pital staff conference that was to be held before the hospital filed its report on
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the examination process, 53 but went on to suggest that, after Wade, the
presence of counsel might well be constitutionally required. 54 In a
lengthy dissent, Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger argued that the
presence of counsel was both unnecessary and disruptive.55
Most state courts which have considered the issue have followed the
lead of the federal courts of appeals in refusing to find a right to counsel
him with the court. Id. The district court denied the request without ex-
planation. Id. The defendant then petitioned the court of appeals for a writ
of mandamus directing the district court to issue the order. Id.
53. 407 F.2d at 696. The court found mandamus to be an inappropriate
remedy in light of the uncertain facts and complex issues presented by the
case in its existing posture. Id.
54. Id. at 698-703. The court in Thornton rejected the argument that
mental examinations should be likened to scientific tests, which would place
them outside the Wade rationale and not subject, under usual circumstances,
to sixth amendment protection. Id. at 699. For a discussion of the court's
argument on this issue, see note 106 and accompanying text infra.
The court also questioned the impartiality of court-appointed psychiatrists.
407 F.2d at 699. For the court's language on this issue, see notes 133-34 and
accompanying text infra. The court, moreover, drew parallels between the
problems of the line-up which led to the Wade result and various shortcomings
apparent from the court's past practical experience in receiving testimony from
experts affiliated with the governmental psychiatric facility utilized by the
district court. 407 F.2d at 699.
The Thornton court drew further parallels between the psychiatric exami-
nation and the line-up. Id. Referring to the Supreme Court's observation in
Wade that a witness, having once identified a suspect in a line-up, is unlikely
to retract the identification at trial, the court stated that, in its experience,
representatives of the psychiatric hospital who are called upon to testify rarely
contradict at trial an opinion voiced at a staff conference. Id. See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 229. In addition, the court stated that the pre-
trial psychiatric staff conference (or examination), like the line-up in Wade,
represented an important confrontation with witnesses likely to testify for the
prosecution. 407 F.2d at 699. In Thornton, for example, assuming the de-
fendant's competency to stand trial, a crucial issue was that of criminal responsi-
bility for his act. Id.
The court went on to suggest that, if at a later date further protection of
the defendant's rights was found to be constitutionally required, such protec-
tion might include recording of the conference or better access to hospital
records as an alternative to the presence of counsel. Id. at 702.
55. Id. at 703-05 (Burger, J., dissenting). Judge Burger contended that
the case no longer presented a live case or controversy and was therefore moot.
Id. at 704 (Burger, J., dissenting). In order to set forth his views on the sixth
amendment right to counsel at pretrial psychiatric encounters, however, Judge
Burger attached, as an appendix to the court's opinion, his supplementary dis-
sent to one of the court's earlier orders issued during the pendency of the
appellate proceedings. Id. at 705 (Burger, J., dissenting). See id. at 709-11
(Burger, J., supplementary dissent). In that supplementary dissent, Judge
Burger distinguished the staff conference from the "confrontation" contem-
plated in Wade on the basis that the conference was neither an adversarial
proceeding nor a critical "prosecutive" stage. Id. at 711 (Burger, J., supple-
mentary dissent). According to Judge Burger: "The value of [the diagnostic]
process is underminded by anything which inhibits the free exchange of views.
. . The legal method of inquiry is unsuited to the medical investigation. . ..
Medical diagnostic procedures should not be inhibited by non-medical notions
of 'due process.' " Id.
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during court-ordered psychiatric examinations." In In re Spencer,5T
the California Supreme Court held that, while the presence of counsel
is not constitutionally required so long as the defendant's rights are
otherwise protected, 58 the question of whether counsel should be per-
mitted to attend a particular examination is best left to the discretion
of the trial court.5 9 In People v. Larsen,60 the Illinois Supreme Court,
56. See In Re Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal. Rptr. 759
(1965); People v. Larsen, 74 Ill. 2d 348, 385 N.E.2d 679 (1979); People v.
Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 192 N.W.2d 215 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972);
State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965). See also Livingston v. State,
542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
57. 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1965). In Spencer,
the defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to charges of murder
and armed robbery. 63 Cal. 2d at 404, 406 P.2d at 35-36, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
Prior to trial, he was examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist. Id. The
defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity before the
trial, but at trial the psychiatrist was permitted to relate the defendant's state-
ments made during the examination. Id. The defendant was convicted by
a jury which fixed the penalty of death. Id. at 402, 406 P.2d at 35, 46 Cal.
R tr. at 755. The judgment was affirmed by the California Supreme Court.
IT On the defendant's application for a writ of habeas corpus, the California
Supreme Court considered the issue of the right to counsel at psychiatric
examinations. Id. at 409-13, 406 P.2d at 39-42, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 759-62.
58. Id. at 412-13, 406 P.2d at 41-42, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62. The court,
in formulating these protections, was especially concerned with preserving the
effectiveness of the examination through unhindered communication between
the psychiatrist and the defendant. Id. at 411-12, 406 P.2d at 41, 46 Cal.
Rptr. at 761. The court set forth the following protections for defendant:
Before submitting to an examination by court-appointed psy-
chiatrists a defendant must be represented by counsel or intelligently
and knowingly have waived that right. Defendant's counsel must be
informed as to the appointment of such psychiatrists. If, after sub-
mitting to an examination, a defendant does not specifically place his
mental condition into issue at the . . . trial, then the court-appointed
psychiatrist should not be permitted to testify at the . . . trial. If the
defendant does specifically place his mental condition into issue at
the . . . trial, then the court-appointed psychiatrist should be per-
mitted to testify at the . . . trial, but the court should instruct the
jurors that the psychiatrist's testimony as to defendant's incriminating
statements should not be regarded as proof of the truth of the facts
disclosed by such statements and that such evidence may be considered
only for the limited purpose of showing the information upon which
the psychiatrist based his opinion.
Id. at 412, 406 P.2d at 41, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 413, 406 P.2d at 42, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
60. 74 Ill. 2d 348, 385 N.E.2d 679 (1979). In Larsen, the state filed a pre-
trial motion under an Illinois statute to require the defendant, who was accused
of murder, to submit to examination by a state-designated psychiatrist. 74 Ill.
2d at 349-50, 385 N.E.2d at 680. At the hearing on the motion, the court
indicated its intention to grant the motion and an assistant state's attorney
stated that he would inform the defendant's counsel of the date, time and loca-
tion of the examination, along with the name of the psychiatrist who would be
the examiner. Id. at 350, 385 N.E.2d at 680. Subsequently, the examination
of the defendant was conducted without notice of any of the details promised
by the assistant state's attorney. Id. at 350, 385 N.E.2d at 681. At trial, the
defendant raised the affirmative defense of insanity at the time of the slaying.
Id. at 349, 385 N.E.2d at 680. The testimony of a psychiatrist presented by
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relying extensively on then-Judge Burger's dissent in Thornton,6 ' held
that a pretrial psychiatric examination is not a "critical stage" requiring
the presence of counsel under Wade.6 2 Justice Clark dissented strenu-
ously from the court's opinion, arguing that the examination was a criti-
cal, adversarial stage of the prosecution,6 3 suggesting that denying coun-
sel the right to be present inhibits effective cross-examination at trial 64
and risks undue reliance by the jury,65 and disputing the conclusions of
the Thornton dissent that the attorney's presence would be inherently
disruptive of the examination. 6
Three other states have dealt with the issue more summarily. In
People v. Martin,67 the Michigan Supreme Court simply left the ques-
the defense was rebutted by the testimony of the psychiatrist who had conducted
the court-ordered examination. Id. at 350-51, 385 N.E.2d at 681. The defend-
ant was convicted of murder following the bench trial. Id. at 349, 385 N.E.2d
at 680.
61. Id. at 354-55, 385 N.E.2d at 682-83. For a discussion of the dissent in
Thornton, see note 55 and accompanying text supra.
62. 74 Ill. 2d at 356, 385 N.E.2d at 683. The Larsen court responded to
the Wade argument by stating that, unlike a line-up, a psychiatric examination
is not inherently suggestive and does not ordinarily pose a grave potential for
substantial prejudice. Id. The majority found nothing in the record to suggest
that counsel's presence was needed to protect the defendant's right to a fair
trial. Id.
63. Id. at 358-59, 385 N.E.2d at 684-85 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark
viewed the examination as part of the adversary proceedings in that a state-
appointed psychiatrist asked questions of the defendant and performed tests.
Thus, while the state, i.e., the prosecutor, did not directly confront the defend-
ant per se, an appointed agent of the state did confront him. Id. at 359, 385
N.E.2d at 685 (Clark, J., dissenting). Moreover, according to Justice Clark, the
defendant might be lulled into a false belief that the psychiatrist is impartial.
Id. In addition, although the examination was not specifically designed to
gather evidence, Justice Clark feared that the examination, investigative in
nature, might result in incriminating statements getting before the trier of
fact. Id.
64. Id. Justice Clark questioned whether effective cross-examination by
the defendant's attorney could be based on the "frequently conclusional, sum-
mary or otherwise inadequate reports of examinations by examining psychia-
trists." Id.
65. Id. at 360, 385 N.E.2d at 685 (Clark, J., dissenting). In his view, since
few laymen understand psychiatric science, the trier of fact may attach undue
weight to what he termed the expert's "value laden" testimony. Id. In order
to combat this, he asserted, the defense attorney "must be thoroughly familiar
with the hypotheses and methods of the State-appointed psychiatrist." Id.
(emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 362-63, 385 N.E.2d at 686 (Clark, J., dissenting). He stressed,
moreover, that characterizing the relationship between the court-appointed
psychiatrist and the defendant as a "doctor-patient relationship" fails to recog-
nize the investigative and adversarial nature of the proceedings. Id.
Justice Clark suggested parenthetically that alternative means, such as video-
taping the examination, might protect the defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel without requiring the actual presence of the attorney. Id. at 363,
385 N.E.2d at 687 (Clark, J., dissenting). For similar endorsements of such
alternative means, see the discussion of the majority opinion in Thornton at
note 54 supra and the discussion of Houston v. State at note 86 infra.
67. 386 Mich. 407, 192 N.W.2d 215 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972).
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tion up to the discretion of the trial judge without dwelling on the
constitutional issues.68 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
State v. Whitlow,3 9 first established safeguards against self-incrimina-
tion 7o and then left the issue to the discretion of the trial judge and
the examining psychiatrist.7 ' Finally, a Texas intermediate appellate
court flatly rejected a defendant's sixth amendment claims, relying on
Wade and Albright.
7 2
68. 386 Mich. at 429, 192 N.W.2d at 226. The court did not frame its
discussion in fifth or sixth amendment terms, but merely explained that the
presence of counsel was a matter left to the trial court's discretion and that
counsel need not be present if, in the opinion of the psychiatrist, presence
would inhibit the examination. Id. (emphasis added). "Basically it is assumed
that, in the search for truth, a psychiatrist should be able to pursue his method-
ology unfettered and that traditional methods of cross-examination will enable
the judge or jury critically to scrutinize all results obtained." Id.
69. 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965). In Whitlow, a pre-Wade case, the
defendant was indicted for murder. Id. at 8, 210 A.2d at 765. Asserting that
he was both incompetent to stand trial and had been insane at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
Id. At the request of the prosecution, the court ordered a psychiatric exami-
nation of the defendant by the state's psychiatrist and the defendant's motion
to have counsel present was denied. Id. at 9, 210 A.2d at 765-66.
70. Id. at 27, 210 A.2d at 776. Although the court framed the question on
appeal in terms of the sixth amendment, the opinion focused on fifth amend-
ment considerations. See id. at 26-29, 210 A.2d at 775-77. The court found
that "[t]he limited privilege of the [psychiatrist] to inquire about the alleged
crime itself, i.e., only when necessary to the formation of an opinion on in-
sanity," and the limited purpose for which any statements made by the defend-
ant may be used at trial, provide sufficient safeguards against the dangers of
self-incrimination inherent in the psychiatric examination. Id. at 27, 210 A.2d
at 776. The court did, however, establish a right for the defendant to have his
psychiatrist present at the examination, finding that such presence could protect
the defendant against improper or oppressive practices. Id. at 28, 210 A.2d at
776.
71. Id. at 27-28, 210 A.2d at 776. The court concluded that, in view of
the nature of psychiatric examinations, "the usual necessity for an extensive
interview between the doctors and defendant," and the safeguards established
to avoid self-incrimination, the presence of the defense attorney at the psychiatric
examination should be left to the discretion of the trial court. Id. The court
limited this discretion, however, with the directive that permission for the
presence of counsel should be granted only if there is no objection from the
examining psychiatrist. Id. at 28, 210 A.2d at 776. If the examining psychiatrist
objects, however, the court directed the trial court to consider "the feasibility
of permitting such devices as recording instruments or the like to be utilized
at the psychiatric interview." Id.
72. Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 933 (1977). In Livingston, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-
jected without discussion a sixth amendment claim that a defendant was entitled
to the presence of counsel during pre-sentencing psychiatric examinations. 542
S.W.2d at 662. The court relied on a prior case in which it had rejected the
argument that, under Wade, a psychiatric examination constitutes a critical
stage of the proceedings at which an accused is entitled to the presence of
counsel. Id. at 662, citing Stultz v. State, 500 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973). In Stultz, the court termed the psychiatric examination non-adversarial
in nature and cited Albright for the proposition that giving full effect to an
accused's fifth amendment privilege obviates the presence of the defendant's
attorney. 500 S.W.2d at 855, citing United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719
(4th Cir. 1968). See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
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The highest courts of two states, however, have held that there is
such a right to counsel under the Constitution. In Lee v. County
Court,7a the lower New York courts had rebuffed the defendant's fifth
amendment objections to the examination and finally ordered that he
submit to the examination outside the presence of counsel.7 4 In review-
ing those orders, the New York Court of Appeals concentrated on the
requirements of Wade in holding the presence of counsel to be constitu-
tionally required. 75 The court went on, however, to restrict the role of
counsel at the examination to that of a passive observer 76 and two
judges dissented strongly from that portion of the decision. 77 Although
73. 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, cert. denied, 404 U.S.
823 (1971). In Lee, the defendant, after indictment for a murder which oc-
curred two days after he was released from a mental hospital, was ordered by
the court to undergo a psychiatric examination. 27 N.Y.2d at 435, 267 N.E.2d
at 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 707. Thereafter, the defendant entered a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity. Id. At trial, the court-appointed psychiatrists
testified that, although the defendant's capacity to appreciate the nature and
consequences of his acts was impaired and that he might not understand that
his conduct was wrong, it was possible for such a person to act rationally at
times. Id. The defendant was found guilty by the jury. Id. The state appel-
late division ordered a new trial at which the defendant again pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity. Id.
74. Id. at 435, 267 N.E.2d at 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 707. Asserting his privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the defendant refused to submit to the court-
ordered mental examination and was found in contempt of court. Id. Follow-
ing the state appellate division's reversal of the contempt order, the lower court
once again granted the prosecutor's request for a mental examination. Id. at
435-36, 267 N.E.2d at 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 707. This order, inter alia, provided
that defense counsel and an assistant district attorney could be present at the
examination, but ordered that, in the event that the defendant refused to
answer the psychiatrist's questions, the court would entertain a motion from the
prosecution to strike the defendant's defense of insanity and deny the defendant
the right to call psychiatric witnesses on his own behalf. Id. at 436, 267 N.E.2d
at 453-54, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 707-08. During the subsequent examination, the
defendant refused to answer questions concerning his activities on the day of
the alleged crime. Id. at 436, 267 N.E.2d at 454, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 708. The
trial court granted the prosecution's motion that the defendant's insanity plea
be stricken, that the defense be precluded from offering its own psychiatric
witnesses, and that the matter proceed to trial. Id. On appeal by the defend-
ant, the state appellate division vacated the order striking the insanity defense,
but directed the defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination without non-
medical personnel present. Id. The defendant appealed to the New York
Court of Appeals. Id.
75. Id. at 438-43, 267 N.E.2d at 455-59, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 709-14. The court
considered the privilege against self-incrimination in the context of the psy-
chiatric examination and concluded that the appellate division had erred when
it ordered that the psychiatric examination be conducted without the presence
of non-medical personnel. Id. Quoting the Wade language which mandates
the presence of counsel at critical stages of the prosecution to preserve the right
to a fair trial, the court concluded without discussion that "[slince pretrial
psychiatric examinations are a critical stage in the prosecution of one accused
of a crime under the Wade rationale, the defendant is entitled to have counsel
present to make more effective his basic right of cross-examination." Id. at
444, 267 N.E.2d at 459, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
76. Id. at 444, 267 N.E.2d at 459, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
77. Id. at 445-48, 267 N.E.2d at 459-61, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 715-18 (Fuld, C.J.,
dissenting in part). Judge Breitel filed a separate opinion agreeing with Chief
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also focusing on the fifth amendment, the Oregon Supreme Court im-
plied in Shepard v. Bowe 78 that the presence of counsel was necessary
to enable the defendant to protect his sixth amendment rights.79 A sub-
sequent intermediate appellate court decision in Oregon 8o interpreted
Shepard as holding that a court could not order the defense attorney
not to be present at a court-ordered examination 81 and found the court-
4 udge Fuld on this issue. Id. at 447-49, 267 N.E.2d at 461-62, 318 N.Y.S.2d at
18-19 (Breitel, J., dissenting in part). Chief Judge Fuld emphasized that
it [is] self-evident that to restrict a defendant's right to a lawyer upon
his pretrial mental examination-at least when he is being questioned
for the purpose of determining his mental condition at the time of the
crime-will frequently have the effect of substantially abridging, if not
eliminating, every right he may have to the effective assistance of coun-
sel in the preparation of his defense.
Id. at 446-47, 267 N.E.2d at 460, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 717 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting in
part). Chief Judge Fuld expressed the fear that, without the advice of counsel
during the examination, the accused might, through remarks to the psychiatrist,
unknowingly provide the prosecution with sufficient evidence to assure convic-
tion by defeating the plea of insanity before the trial begins. Id. at 447, 267
N.E.2d at 461, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 717 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting in part).
78. 250 Or. 288, 442 P.2d 238 (1968). In Shepard, the defendant, charged
with the criminal offense of failing to stop at the scene of an accident resulting
in an injury, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 289, 442 P.2d at
239. On motion by the District Attorney, the trial court ordered the defendant
to submit to an examination by a psychiatrist selected either by the court or
the District Attorney, and soon after clarified its order to include both a man-
date that the defendant answer questions concerning his conduct relating to
the offense charged and an order prohibiting defense counsel from advising
his client not to answer questions on the grounds that they might incriminate
him. Id. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in response to defendant's petition,
issued a writ of mandamus, ordering the trial court to show cause why it should
not vacate its order. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court characterized the issue
faced as:
Does the court have the authority to require that the defendant, at a
pretrial mental examination, answer questions concerning his conduct
relating to the offense charged, and can the court order defendant's
counsel not to advise his client to refuse to answer questions upon the
ground that they might incriminate him?
Id. at 290, 442 P.2d at 239.
79. Id. at 289-95, 442 P.2d at 239-41.
80. State v. Corbin, 15 Or. App. 536, 576 P.2d 1314 (1973). In Corbin,
prior to a trial which resulted in a conviction for murder, the defendant agreed
to the District Attorney's request that he be examined by a psychiatrist. Id. at
538-39, 516 P.2d at 1315-16. The psychiatrist did not inform the defendant of
his Miranda rights, submitted a written report to the district attorney, and
testified at trial that, in his opinion, the defendant was not suffering from an
extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide. Id. at 539-40, 516
P,2d at 1316. The defendant asserted that the trial court erred in not sup-
pressing the evidence obtained by the psychiatrist's examination, arguing, inter
alia, that Miranda warnings given to him hours before the psychiatric exami-
nation were insufficient to apprise him of his right to refuse to talk and to have
his attorney present. Id. at 544, 516 P.2d at 1318.
81. State v. Corbin, 15 Or. App. 536, 544, 576 P.2d 1314, 1318 (1973). The
court interpreted Shepard as holding: 1) that a defendant being examined pur-
suant to a court order could not be compelled to answer questions which might
incriminate him and 2) that a court could not order a defendant's attorney to
.be excluded from the examination. Id.
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appointed psychiatrist to be an officer of the state and, consequently, the
examination to be an adversarial proceeding.
8 2
In addition, the Alaska Supreme Court, in Houston v. State,88 citing
and incorporating the reasoning of Wade,8 4 held that the guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel afforded by the Alaska constitution s5
"required the presence of counsel at a court-ordered psychiatric inter-
view conducted by the government's expert witness." SD
The Houston court analogized the court-ordered psychiatric exami-
nation to other situations to which it had extended the right to counsel,
for example, during pre-indictment lineups 87 and during the taking of
handwriting exemplars while the accused is in pretrial confinement.88
The court found that, in those situations, the right to counsel was based
on the ground that counsel might notice improprieties not readily
recognizable by a defendant and, therefore, that the presence of counsel
might enhance the effectiveness of cross-examination at trial.8 9 The
court concluded that the same considerations applied to the court-ordered
82. State v. Corbin, 15 Or. App. 536, 544, 576 P.2d 1314, 1318 (1973). The
court considered the psychiatrist conducting the examination for the state to be
an officer of the state and, when questioning a defendant, no different from
any police officer. Id. The court thus concluded that a valid consent to a
psychiatric examination may not be obtained without the defendant's knowing
and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. Id.
The Corbin court found such requirements necessary to dispel any belief
by the defendant that: 1) statements made to the psychiatrist would not, or
could not, be used at trial against him; and 2) statements made to the psychia-
trist would be for the defendant's own good. Id. at 546, 516 P.2d at 1319.
Rather, the court noted, "the defendant must be aware that the psychiatrist is
employed by his adversary and is not primarily his healer." Id.
83. 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979).
84. Id. at 795. For a discussion of Wade, see notes 22-30 and accompanying
text supra.
85. 602 P.2d at 795. The Alaska counterpart to the U.S. Constitution's
sixth amendment guarantee of counsel reads in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions .... [t]he accused is entitled ... to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § I. Compare id. with U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. For the pertinent text of the sixth amendment, see note 3 supra.
86. 602 P.2d at 795. In Houston, the defendant submitted to a court-
ordered psychiatric examination by a state-selected psychiatrist. Id. at 786.
Defense counsel requested permission to be present, or, in the alternative, to
have the examination "taped." Id. The court did not elaborate as to the
type of taping requested. Id. Both requests were denied by the superior court.
Id. Although the examination occurred during the trial, the Alaska Supreme
Court refused to draw a distinction between pretrial and mid-trial examinations.
Id. at 795.
87. Id. at 795. See Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 641-42 (Alaska 1977)
(suspect in custody is entitled to presence of counsel at pre-indictment lineup
unless exigent circumstances exist so that providing counsel would interfere
with a "prompt and purposeful" investigation).
88. 602 P.2d at 795. See Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 343-45 (Alaska
1969) (defendant who yielded handwriting exemplar to police under compulsion
was denied his state constitutional right to counsel at a critical stage of the.
proceedings against him).
89. 602 P.2d at 795-96.
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psychiatric examination." The court stated further that it was per-
.suaded by the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in Lee 91 and
the Oregon Supreme Court in Shepard,92 as well as the reasoning of an
Oregon appellate decision, 93 terming those opinions close to the spirit




Wade requires the courts to "analyze whether potential substantial
prejudice to a defendant's rights inheres in [a] particular confrontation
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice." 95 Although
most courts have not fully adopted this analysis in passing on the right
to counsel at pretrial psychiatric examinations,96 it is submitted that it
provides the best framework within which to compare and contrast the
various relevant issues and to survey the important decisions in this area.
A. Wade's First Prong: Potential Substantial Prejudice
The Wade Court, in requiring the presence of an attorney at line-
ups, focused on the dangers of suggestion and improper influence in-
herent in the process being scrutinized.97 Such prejudicial influence
might not be detected by a defendant, and could lead to the defendant
being unable to recount at trial any unfairness that occurred at the
lineup.98 That there is an issue of whether similar dangers inherent in
the psychiatric examination may have comparable results in under-
90. Id. at 795-96. The court suggested that all further psychiatric inter-
views should be tape recorded in their entirety to improve accuracy in the
presentation of evidence surrounding the examination at the trial and to pro-
vide the defendant and his counsel, at their discretion, with an alternative to
counsel's actual presence during the examination. Id. at 796.
91. Id. at 795. For a discussion of Lee, see notes 73-76 and accompanying
-text supra.
92. 602 P.2d at 795. For a discussion of Shepard, see notes 78-79 and
,accompanying text supra.
93. 602 P.2d at 795, citing State v. Corbin, 15 Or. App. 536, 516 P.2d 1314
(1973). For a discussion of Corbin, see notes 80-82 and accompanying text
supra.
94. 602 P.2d at 795.
95. 388 U.S. at 227. For a discussion of Wade, see notes 22-30 and accom-
panying text supra.
96. Most courts which do not adopt the Wade analysis contend that the
psychiatric examination is not the type of pretrial confrontation with the prose-
cution contemplated by Wade. See the discussion of federal and state cases
rejecting sixth amendment protection for court-ordered psychiatric examinations
in notes 31-72 and accompanying text supra.
97. 388 U.S. at 228-29, 235. For a discussion of this portion of the Wade
opinion, see notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
98. 388 U.S. at 230-32.
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mining the defendant's right to a fair trial has been recognized by both
courts 19 and commentators. 00
1. The Unreliability of the Psychiatric Examination
One potential danger present in a psychiatric examination is that
the results of the examination may be unreliable 101 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Wax v. Pate,02 al-
though rejecting the notion that the psychiatric examination was a critical
stage in criminal proceedings, 103 took judicial notice "that the results of
psychiatric observations and examinations are often a good bit more
conjectural than the results of scientific laboratory tests ....... 104
Similarly, in Thornton,0 5 the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
argument that, for sixth amendment purposes, mental tests were analo-
gous to, and as reliable as, scientific tests.10 6 Then-Judge Burger who
99. See notes 102-09 and accompanying text infra.
100. See notes 114-26 and accompanying text infra.
101. "'Unreliability' has become an umbrella term referring to such factors
as uncertainty in diagnosing past, present and future states of mind; the intru-
sion of a psychiatrist's personal prejudice into his allegedly neutral observation;
and the vagueness of labels used by psychiatrists to describe mental illness."
Shell, Psychiatric Testimony: Science or Fortune-Telling?, 7 BARRISTER 6 (Fall
1980). For a review of cases and commentators on the issue of unreliability,
see notes 102-26 and accompanying text infra.
102. 298 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1967), aff'd, 409 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1969).
For a discussion of the court of appeals opinion in Wax, see notes 47-51 and
accompanying text supra.
103. 298 F. Supp. at 167.
104. Id. The scientific laboratory tests to which the court alluded were
ones which yield conclusive results, such as fingerprint identification methods,
blood type matching and hair analysis. Id. See Halleck, The Psychiatrist and
the Legal Process, PsYcH. TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 25. In his article, Halleck dis-
puted the presumption which he believes underlies legal rules guiding psychia-
trists and the courts in the assessment of criminal responsibility of a defendant
for his acts, i.e., that mental illness is a clearly defined condition, Id. at 26.
The author stated in explanation:
In this decade some psychiatrists consider mental illness a biological
disorder while others think of it as a social role or as a convenient
metaphor for describing maladaptive behavior. Most psychiatrists
probably adopt the latter position. Yet, the rules for assessing respon-
sibility [of the criminal offender] are based on assumptions that mental
illness is an affliction, something superimposed upon an individual's
personality.
Id. The author noted, as an example of the lack of a consensus among psychia-
trists as to the nature of mental illness, the inability of psychiatrists to come to
an agreement on a workable definition of terms such as "psychosis." Id. at 27.
Halleck also stated that "the criminal offender does not fit easily into psychiatric
classifications. When he does he is usually put into one of the borderline
categories." Id.
105. 407 F.2d at 695. For a discussion of Thornton, see notes 52-54 and
accompanying text supra.
106. 407 F.2d at 699. The court referred to the lack of agreement among
experts concerning either the theory or technique appropriate to diagnosis of
mental illness and the large number of "variable factors" involved in the for-
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dissented in Thornton,x0 later questioned the reliability of psychiatric
decision-making in a Supreme Court decision, 08 noting that "[t]here
can be little responsible debate regarding 'the uncertainty of diagnosis
in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.' " 109
Not all courts agree on this lack of reliability, however. For ex-
ample, the Second Circuit, in Baird,"0 asserted that there is not "the
widespread distrust of psychiatric examination that there [was] of eye
witness identifications made under marginal circumstances of reliability"
in a lineup."' In Larsen,X"2 the Illinois Supreme Court declared that a
court-ordered examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist was not
inherently suggestive and did not ordinarily pose a grave potential for
substantial prejudice. 118
One commentary has lamented the fact that judges and legislators
seem to be unaware of the "enormous and relatively consistent body of
professional literature questioning the reliability and validity of psychi-
atric evaluations and predictions," 114 while another author, writing about
mulation of a diagnosis in an insanity defense. Id. On this basis, the court
further distinguished the mental examination from scientific tests such as finger-
prints and blood samples which other courts had found did not require the
presence of counsel. Id. at 698-99. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966) (the taking of a blood sample without an attorney present does not
violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel).
107. 407 F.2d at 703-05 (Burger, J., dissenting). See note 55 and accom-
panying text supra.
108. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (a civil commitment
situation).
109. Id. at 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring), quoting Greenwood v. United
States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956). In 1964, then-judge Burger also wrote that
psychiatrists "may be claiming too much in relation to what they really under-
stand about the human personality and human behavior." Burger, Psychiatrists,
Lawyers, and the Courts, 28 FED. PROB. 3, 7 (June 1964).
110. 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970). For a
.discussion of Baird, see notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
111. 414 F.2d at 712.
112. 74 Ill. 2d 348, 385 N.E.2d 679 (1979).
113. Id. at 353-56, 385 N.E.2d at 682-84. For a discussion of Larsen, see
notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
114. Ennis &c Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flip-
ping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 695 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Ennis]. Although the Ennis article focuses on civil psychiatric commit-
ments and not court-ordered psychiatric examinations, it offers insight into the
reliability of psychiatric examinations. See id. The authors presented a com-
prehensive review of studies available on the topic of psychiatric competency
in civil commitments and concluded, inter alia, that "there [was] no evidence
warranting the assumption that psychiatrists can accurately determine who is
'dangerous.'" Id. at 696. See Steadman & Cocozza, We Can't Predict Who is
Dangerous, PSYCH. TODAY, Jan. 1975, at 32. Steadman and Cocozza also focused
on involuntary civil commitment of medical patients and claimed that, because
psychiatrists cannot accurately predict who will become violent or dangerous,
they consistently "overpredict," i.e., "[t]hey assume that since some patients are
dangerous, the one under consideration might be." Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
This tendency, while denying liberty to some non-dangerous patients, has the
advantage to the psychiatrist of decreasing chances that an error on his part
-1980-1981]
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court-ordered psychiatric examinations, asserted that judges and attor-
ney are not aware of how the character of a psychiatric examination
may affect the findings of the psychiatrist. 115
Other commentators have noted several factors inherent in psychi-
atric examinations which could affect the examining psychiatrist and
prejudice a criminal defendant, including the effect of the setting in
which the defendant is observed," 6 the class and cultural differences
between the psychiatrist and the defendant,"17 the personal bias of the
will be exposed by the commission of a violent act by a patient whom he had
declared to be non-dangerous. Id. This tendency to overpredict was also
discussed in Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitments: A Knife
That Cuts Both Ways, PSYCH. TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 43.
It is arguable that the rationale underlying the tendency to "overpredict"
in the civil commitment area-to avoid putting dangerous people on the street-
may also result in a tendency to "underpredict" in insanity defense cases-i.e.,
such psychiatrists will be reluctant to allow "guilty" persons to avoid prison
terms through an insanity plea and thus "go free."
115. A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: A FIELD
STUDY 84 (1970). Matthews stated:
A competent psychiatric report will specify the limitations of its in-
vestigation: the length and circumstances of the examination, the op-
portunity to obtain psychological and other laboratory testing and to
interview relatives and friends of the patient, and the completeness of
the history derived from the patient and from hospital and court
records. Most competency examinations are abbreviated in all these
respects, and abbreviation comes to typify the reports themselves,
inadequacy establishing its own standard, as it were.
Id. at 84. See United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 634 n.5 (M.D. Pa.
1975) (examination lasting only ten minutes was held not to be inadequate).
For a comprehensive treatment of the role of mental health professionals
in the criminal law, in which the authors assert that "imprecision and specu-
lation is and must be tolerated" when it is put forth by qualified clinical experts,
see Bonnie 8c Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal
Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 (1980). The
authors recognize that many psychiatrists have no special forensic training and
are "not adequately sensitive to risks of unreliability and imprecision in the
evaluation process," but assert that the best way to remedy this is to improve
the quality of clinical participation in the criminal process. Id. at 522. To this
end, the authors put forward specific recommendations to improve the data
collection process in a forensic evaluation and to assure reliability in opinion-
formation. Id. at 496-522.
116. See Ennis, supra note 114 at 722-23. Viewing a patient in a mental
hospital setting has been found to dispose psychiatrists toward a diagnosis of
psychosis. Id. at 722. The authors concluded that "clinicians often perceive
what they expect to perceive and the impact of suggestion on clinical perception
may be profound." Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 724-26, The authors noted that
in a controlled experiment . . . [it was] found that the diagnoses of
psychiatric residents were highly influenced by the imagined socio-
economic history of the patient (and by the perceived diagnoses of
other, prestigious psychiatrists) independent of the clinical picture
presented. A lower socio-economic history biased diagnosis toward
greater illness and poorer prognosis. ... [A]ccording to [other] studies,
... clinicians may be influenced to conclude that lower socio-economic
individuals are ... presumed to be impulsive and therefore more prone
to violence.
Id. at 725 (citations omitted).
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psychiatrist,"l8 and the values and attitudes of psychiatrists as a group." 9
Particularly significant to the criminal defendant is the observation that
"psychiatrists as a group are likely to be paternalistic and therefore rela-
tively insensitive to considerations of civil liberty." 120 Furthermore,
commentators have expressed concern over the weight given by the trier
of fact to psychiatric testimony.121 The examining psychiatrist is fre-
quently called to testify as an expert witness at the defendant's trial.
Unlike other witnesses, however, psychiatrists are often asked to present
their opinion as to the defendant's responsibility and punishability. 122
Moreover, it has been observed that psychiatrists are often asked to
"'testify and answer questions which go beyond [their] own training and
competence." 123 Perhaps as a result of the unique testimony psychia-
trists present, it is said that courts and jurors tend to give excessive and
disproportionate weight to such testimony.124 Acceptance of psychiatric
118. Id. at 726-29. In one study, researchers discovered that observations
and perceptions of psychiatrists tend to reflect their own personality structures
and problems. Raines & Rohrer, The Operational Matrix of Psychiatric Prac-
tice II: Variability in Psychiatric Impression and the Projection Hypothesis,
117 AM. J. PSYCH. 133 (1960). Another study revealed evidence that clinicians'
varying personal biases may account for significant differences in their evalua-
tions of complex and ambiguous case history data. Grosz 8c Grossman, The
Sources of Observer Variation and Bias in Clinical Judgments: 1. The Item of
Psychiatric History, 138 J. NERv. MENT. Dis. 105, 111 (1964). For a discussion
of the problem of impartiality, see notes 127-36 and accompanying text infra.
119. See Ennis, supra note 114, at 728. The authors state, by way of
example, that "psychiatrists as a group may have little tolerance for deviant
behavior and consequently may require a high standard of community adjust-
ment." Id.
120. Id. at 729. The authors refer to an attitudinal survey of California
psychiatrists. See ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW
MENTAL HEALTH LAW 210-11 (1972).
121. See notes 122-26 and accompanying text infra.
122. Halleck, supra note 104, at 27.
123. Id. at 28. Psychiatric testimony is presented predominantly in "con-
clusory" form, thus bringing into question the nature of psychiatric testimony
as well as the weight given it. Arens, The Durham Rule in Action: Judicial
Psychiatry. and Psychiatric Justice, 1 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 41, 48 (June 1967).
In reviewing experiences based on contact with the psychiatric facility utilized
by the District of Columbia courts, Arens stated that "[e]xplanation of a given
condition and how it arose, developed, and affected the mental and emotional
process of the defendant is minimal. Supporting data are predigested for the
jury and the final conclusion of 'with' or 'without mental disorder' is stated
with maximum emphasis." Id. at 48. Arens further asserted that the indi-
viduality of the defendant rarely emerges from such testimony. Id. "The
testimony is nonetheless presented with an air of certitude which has an obvious
appeal to the lay mind." Id. For further discussion of the conclusory form of
psychiatric testimony, see Note, Right to Counsel at the Pretrial Mental Exami-
nation of an Accused, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 448, 452 (1970).
124. See A. MATTHEWS, supra note 115, at 122-23. Matthews found that
judges in one jurisdiction unquestioningly accepted the independent psychia-
trist's evaluation regarding the defendant's capacity to stand trial. Id. See
Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Rele-
vance, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 559, 580 (1972); Reisner 8c Sommel, Abolishing the
Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act
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opinion as fact can thus shift the decision-making power from the fact-
finders to the court-appointed psychiatrist.125 The danger of such undue
reliance on psychiatric testimony was also noted in Justice Clark's dissent
in Larsen as support for the proposition that defense counsel should be
present at the examination in order to cross-examine more effectively
at trial. 2
6
2. Impartiality of the Court-Appointed Psychiatrist
Most courts which deny the right to counsel during court-ordered
psychiatric examinations assume-implicitly, if not expressly,-that the
court-appointed psychiatrist is impartial both during the examination
and at trial; and, therefore, that his examination is, unlike a lineup,
non-adversarial. 27 A number of courts and commentators, however,
have rejected this assumption suggesting that the court-appointed psy-
chiatrist, unlike the independent practitioner, is not impartial and does
assume an adversarial role. The impartiality of the court-appointed
psychiatrist may be suspect for a number of reasons, the first of which
relates to the process by which courts select the psychiatrists to conduct
examinations. In some jurisdictions, the District Attorney has a large
degree of influence over the process of establishing an eligibility list
from which court-appointed psychiatrists are drawn. 28 Furthermore,
in Light of the Swedish Experience, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 770 (1974). Other
researchers have found that jurors almost never find contrary to the opinion of
the court-appointed psychiatrist. See Guttmacher & Weihofen, The Psychiatrist
on the Witness Stand, 32 B.U. L. REV. 287, 313-14 (1952).
125. See Reisner, supra note 124, at 772. See also D. LOUISELL 9C H. WIL-
LIAMs, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW 405 (1960). The authors stated: "It seems
apparent that, under the common practice of court appointment of several
neutral experts on pleas of insanity in criminal cases, the in camera conclusions
of the experts almost always control the outcome." Id. Cf. Guttmacher &
Weihofen, supra note 124, at 288 (juries seldom find contrary to psychiatric
testimony). Similarly, in viewing the experiences of the District of Columbia,
Gray concluded: "Although they are only participants in the adversary process,
[court-appointed] psychiatrists, because of the lack of opposing experts, have
often taken the position of advisor to the court and therefore, have been able
to make the decisive determination in the vast majority of insanity defense
cases." Gray, supra note 124, at 580.
126. See 74 Ill. 2d at 360, 385 N.E.2d at 685 (Clark, J., dissenting). Jurors
may place too much credence in psychiatry, which is not an exact science, and
on psychiatric evidence which is merely "derivative." Id. For a discussion of
this tendency, see notes 123-25 and accompanying text supra; Diamond &
Louisell, The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Specula-
tions, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1965). For a discussion of the enhancement
of effective cross-examination afforded by the attorney's presence at a psychiatric
examination, see notes 153-63 and accompanying text infra.
127. See notes 31-72 and accompanying text supra. The Fifth Circuit ex-
pressly termed the examination non-adversarial. United States v. Smith, 436
F.2d at 790. For a discussion of Smith, see notes 36-38 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of the court's refusal to treat the court-ordered psy-
chiatric examination as adversarial, see Comment, supra note 1, at 428.
128. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, READINGS IN LAW
& PsycnrATRY 146, 148 (1968). Dr. Diamond noted that psychiatrists who are
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since a psychiatrist who has once testified at trial may be labelled as
pro-prosecution or pro-defense, one commentator has asserted that the
process of selecting court-appointed psychiatrists often ensures that only
those thought to have pro-prosecution biases are chosen to examine-
criminal defendants.
29
In addition, even assuming that the selection of a psychiatrist is.
free of system bias, that is, the psychiatrist selected is not identified as,
favoring either the prosecution or defense, the personal and group biases
of psychiatrists-noted above in reference to the effect of such biases on
the reliability of psychiatric testimony-may affect their impartiality
during examination of the defendant.2 0
Finally, it has been suggested that, since it is inevitable that the
psychiatrist's opinion will align him with one side of the conflict, he
experiences a close operational identification with that side, and will
subjectively desire that "his side wins." 131 This identification can be
known in the community to have liberal views are excluded from court appoint-
ment. Id. It is only natural, he stated, for the District Attorney to seek out
psychiatrists who are known for expressing conservative opinions. Id. Thus,
Dr. Diamond asserts that the psychiatrists who are sought out by the court as.
being impartial have an "equal probability of being overly identified with
authority, of being a sort of watch-dog of public morals, and motivated toward
seeing that no criminal 'gets away with anything.' " Id.
In another study, the authors interviewed former members of the staff of
the United States Attorney's office in the District of Columbia and of St. Eliza-
beth's Hospital, the psychiatric facility utilized by the District of Columbia
courts. Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand,
10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 505 (1972). The authors found that, in some instances,
"doctors . . . contact[ed] the prosecutor for his 'opinion' as to the defendant's.
mental condition." Id. at 510. On the other hand, the authors concluded that
defense counsel was contacted rarely, if ever; even though defense counsel is-
just as able to give a lay opinion about the defendant's mental condition. Id.
at 510 n.20. The authors also observe that it is not uncommon "for the hospital
doctors to ask the prosecutor if he would oppose a certain diagnosis: if the
prosecutor indicates opposition, the questioned diagnosis may never come to,
light." Id. at 510.
For a general discussion of the impartiality of psychiatrists, see Diamond Q<
Louisell, supra note 126, at 1344-45; Mullen & Norman, Innovations in Foren-
sics: Developing Criteria for Determination of Dangerous Behavior, 7 J. PsYcH..
& LAW 187 (1979). See also T. SzAsz, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 56 (1965).
129. Diamond, supra note 128, at 148. Dr. Diamond explained that psy--
chiatrists who serve as court-appointees are often interested in law-related
psychiatry, and "are less inclined to probe deeply, more inclined to accept
uncritically surface manifestations, and prone to interpret the legal criteria for
insanity in a narrowly restricted way." Id.
130. See Halleck, supra note 104, at 25-26. For a discussion of how the-
reliability of psychiatric evidence is affected by the psychiatrist's personal and
professional bias, see notes 114-20 and accompanying text supra.
131. See Diamond, supra note 128, at 146. This unconscious identification
with one side may present itself as an "aloof, detached facsimile of impartiality
that masks his secret hope for victory of his own opinion. Such a detached
witness may be totally unconscious of the innumerable subtle distortions and'
biases in his testimony that spring from his wish to triumph." Id.
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manifested in various ways, such as a conscious, deliberate strategy plan
with the attorney for that side or an unconscious distortion or bias in
the trial testimony of the psychiatrist.18 2
The impartiality of court-appointed psychiatrists has not gone un-
questioned by some courts. The majority in Thornton, for example,
reserved the question of the right to presence of counsel at court-ordered
psychiatric examinations,8 8 but implied that, because experts affiliated
with the governmental psychiatric facility "normally testify for the
Government," their impartiality may be open to question.8 4 Similarly,
the dissent in Larsen characterized the court-appointed psychiatrist as
an agent of the state and, thus, the prosecution 185 and noted that, al-
though the purpose of the examination was not to gather evidence, the
examination was nevertheless of an investigative nature which at times
resulted in incriminating statements coming to the attention of the
trier of fact.
36
B. Wade's Second Prong: The Ability of Counsel to Avoid Prejudice
Beyond the question of potential prejudice to the defendant's right
to a fair trial, the Wade court also considered whether the presence of
counsel in a given situation would aid in avoiding that prejudice.
137
This second prong of the Wade analysis raises two interrelated issues
in the context of the court-ordered psychiatric examination: 1) the dis-
ruptive effect of the presence of counsel during the examination, and
2) the role of counsel during the examination.
8
132. Id. Only some of these distortions may be challenged effectively on
cross-examination. Id.
133. 407 F.2d at 699. In comparing the lineup in Wade to the psychiatric
staff conference, the court stressed its opinion that, like a witness who makes
an identification at a line-up, a psychiatrist attending a psychiatric staff con-
ference is unlikely to change his mind once the decision is made. Id. at 699.
For a further discussion of Thornton, see notes 52-54 and accompanying text
supra.
134. 407 F.2d at 699.
135. 74 Ill. 2d at 359, 385 N.E.2d at 685 (Clark, J:, dissenting). For a dis-
cussion of this dissent, see notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra. See also
Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d at 702-03; Note, supra note 123, at 449.
136. 74 Il. 2d at 359, 385 N.E.2d at 685 (Clark, J., dissenting). See In re
Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d at 410, 406 P.2d at 40, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 760 (testimony of
psychiatrist as to incriminating statements made by defendant during psychiatric
examination admitted at trial). For a discussion of Spencer, see notes 57-59 and
accompanying text supra.
137. 388 U.S. at 228-39. For a discussion of Wade, see notes 22-30 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of potential prejudice to a defendant
during a psychiatric examination, see notes 97-126 and accompanying text supra.
138. For a discussion of these issues, see notes 139-63 and accompanying
text infra.
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1. The Disruptive Effect of the Presence of Counsel
Many courts which have considered the issue have endorsed the
reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Albright, a9 which articulated a fear
that the presence of a non-medical third party would limit the effective-
ness of the psychiatric examination.140 In discussions of the potentially
disruptive effect of the presence of counsel, then-Judge Burger's dissent
in Thornton has often been relied upon for the propositions that
"[m]edical diagnostic procedures should not be inhibited by non-medical
notions of procedural due process," 141 and that the medical inquiry
should "be divested as much as possible of an adversary character." 142
These views have been criticized, however, for their failure to distinguish
between the roles of the psychiatrist as therapist/healer and as court-
appointed diagnostician/expert witness. 143 In a somewhat confusing
position is one court which found the presence of counsel to be disrup-
tive, yet permitted a marshall and a guard to be present during the
examination.144
139. 388 F.2d at 719. For a discussion of Albright, see notes 33-38 and
accompanying text supra.
140. 388 U.S. at 726. See United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d at 790 (reciting
the Albright holding without further reasoning). For a discussion of Smith,
see notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra. See also United States v. Cohen,
530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855.(1976) (since self-incrimination
is not a danger, there is no need for counsel to instruct the accused and inter-
ference with the examination on other grounds would be improper). For a
discussion of Cohen, see note 38 supra. See also United States v. Bohle, 445
F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of Bohle, see note 50 supra.
141. 407 F.2d at 711 (Burger, J., supplementary dissent). Considering a
request by defense counsel to be present at a staff conference in which the
defendant's diagnosis would be made, Judge Burger cautioned that the value of
sensitive diagnostic procedures was undermined by anything inhibiting the free
exchange of information and that the "presence of a lawyer for the patient at
a staff conference would obviously inhibit the free expression and exchange of
ideas which normally occurs." Id. But see Chief Justice Burger's views con-
cerning the questionable reliability of psychiatric evaluations in notes 108-09
and accompanying text supra.
142. 407 F.2d at 711 (Burger, J., supplementary dissent). He called for an
approach which encouraged cooperation rather than partisanship in pursuing
an "objective, uninhibited inquiry, uncluttered by the techniques and devices
of the courtroom." Id. For further discussion of Thornton, see notes 52-54
and accompanying text supra.
143. See, e.g., People v. Larsen, 74 Ill. 2d at 362-63, 385 N.E.2d at 686-87
(Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark argued that: "[I]t is true the pretrial
psychiatric examination is of an intimate nature, but portraying the examina-
tion as involving a doctor-patient relationship, where the doctor is State ap-
pointed and may have an enduring relationship with the State, is a bit
strained." Id., 385 N.E.2d at 686 (Clark, J., dissenting).
144. United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d at 787. The defendant's hands and
feet were also chained during the examination. Id. at 789. The court termed
these measures precautionary and necessary to protect the examining psychiatrist
from the defendant, who was described as "a desperate and dangerous char-
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Other courts, however, while not affirmatively establishing a right
to presence of counsel, have not found it to be per se disruptive. At
least one court would permit counsel's presence at the discretion of the
court 145 and another would do the same unless there is an objection
from the examining psychiatrist. 46 In Lee, the New York Court of
Appeals, in holding that there was a sixth amendment right to counsel
during psychiatrist examinations, dealt with the problem of potential
disruption by limiting the attorney's role to that of passive observer; '47
while the majority in Houston anticipated that a more active role might
be appropriate under some circumstances. 148
.2. The Role of Counsel at the Psychiatric Examination
In Albright, the majority reasoned that, since statements made by
the accused during the course of the psychiatric examination are not
-admissible in evidence on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceedings, 49
the need for the presence of counsel during the examination was obvi-
ated. 5 0 This view of the attorney's role was also articulated in United
States v. Smith, in which the court used the inadmissibility of inculpa-
tory statements to support the proposition that the psychiatric exami-
nation was non-adversarial and, thus, that the presence of counsel was
unnecessary.' 5' Similarly, in Stukes v. Shovlin, the Third Circuit, in
agreement with the district court, concluded that the attorney at an
examination could do "nothing except test the accuracy of medical con-
clusions drawn from the doctor's observation." 152
145. In re Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1965).
For a discussion of Spencer, see notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
146. State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. at 27-29, 210 A.2d at 776-77. For a discus-
sion of Whitlow, see notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
147. Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d at 445, 267 N.E.2d at 459, 318
N.Y.S.2d at 715. The Lee majority directed that attorneys for both the state
and the defense, be permitted to be present during the psychiatric examination.
Id. at 444, 267 N.E.2d at 459, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 715. For a discussion of Lee as
-well as dissenting opinions arguing for a more active role, see notes 73-77 and
accompanying text supra.
148. 602 P.2d at 796 n.23. The Houston court noted that, for the most
part, it viewed the role of defense counsel to be that of passive observer during
the examination, but left open the possibility that this role might be altered
by necessity during a particular situation, e.g., in the presence of intimidation
-or coercion. Id.
149. 388 F.2d at 725. The court explained that, in its view, the defendant
was protected by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
against the danger that a statement concerning guilt, revealed during the
-examination, would be used against him at trial. Id.
150. Id. at 725-26. For further discussion of Albright, see notes 33-38 and
accompanying text supra.
151. 436 F.2d at 790. The Smith court treated the petitioner's right to
-counsel summarily, stating "[it] gives us little pause." Id. For further discus-
:sion of Smith, see notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
152. 464 F.2d at 1213 n.4. For a discussion of Stukes, see notes 39-41 and
.accompanying text supra.
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Other courts have criticized this narrowly circumscribed view of the
role for the attorney. 15 The Houston'court, in holding that there was
a right to counsel during psychiatric examinations,1 4 found persuasive
two defense contentions which, in the court's estimation, demonstrated
that the presence of an attorney could make important contributions
toward reducing potential prejudice to the defendant. 155 First, an at-
torney at the psychiatric examination might notice and bring to the
court's attention improprieties, which the "accused, a layman probably
frightened by the investigation," may fail to perceive.' 56 Second, the
attorney's presence at the examination will allow his later cross-exami-
nation as to the circumstances in which the examination was conducted,
including possible coercion or factors tending to produce inaccuracies,
to be grounded in facts observed firsthand.
157
In considering the benefits of the presence of counsel, the Larsen
dissent elaborated on this second factor, the enhancement of the attor-
ney's ability to cross-examine the psychiatrist at trial after being present
at the examination.15s It concluded that, in order for cross-examination
to be meaningful, the defense attorney "must 'have some understanding
of the psychiatrist's diagnostic techniques' and 'know the methodology
and approach followed if he is to be able to challenge effectively the
validity of the conclusions reached by the state psychiatrist.' " 159
One commentator has also asserted that meaningful cross-exami-
nation of a psychiatrist can only come about if the attorney is present
153. See Houston v. State, 602 P.2d at 784; People v. Larsen, 74 Ill. 2d at
359-60, 385 N.E.2d at 685 (Clark, J., dissenting). See also Ennis, supra note
114, at 745. For a discussion of these criticisms, see notes 154-63 and accom-
panying text infra. For a discussion of Houston, see notes 83-94 and accom-
panying text supra. For a discussion of Larsen, see notes 60-66 and accompany-
ing text supra.
154. For a discussion of Houston, see notes 83-94 and accompanying text
.supra.
155. 602 P.2d at 795.
156. Id., quoting Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 343-44 (Alaska 1969).
157. 602 P.2d at 795.
158. 74 Ill. 2d at 359, 385 N.E.2d at 685 (Clark, J., dissenting).
159. Id. The Larsen dissent also stressed that reports given to attorneys
after a psychiatric examination are often conclusory and offer little upon which
to base effective cross-examination. Id. Justice Clark questioned the ability
-of defense counsel to provide adequate cross-examination of the psychiatrist
based on "frequently conclusional, summary or otherwise inadequate reports of
examinations by the examining psychiatrists." Id. For an example of such a
conclusory report, see Calloway v. United States, 270 F.2d 334, 335 (D.C. Cir.
1959). The report in Calloway read: "Jacob Calloway was admitted to District
-of Columbia General Hospital July 18, 1958. Psychiatric examination reveals
this patient to be sane, competent and capable of participating in his defense.
He may be returned to the court at any time." Id. Defendant Calloway was
later brought to trial where his sole defense was insanity. Id. For a discussion
of the conclusory nature of these reports, see note 123 supra. For a discussion
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when his or her client is examined. 160 He explained that, because at-
torneys are not present at the examination, they cannot "go behind" a
conclusory report and cross-examine as to the individual circumstances
which might have influenced the psychiatrist's judgment in preparing
that report, since the defendant often "does not remember what the
psychiatrist has omitted or misstated, or is in no position to challenge
the psychiatrist's recollection of the interview" 161 and cannot assist the
attorney in reconstructing the details of the examination. 162 Conse-
quently, the attorney's ability to cross-examine the psychiatrist at trial
is hampered. 63 .
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that, under the Wade analysis, a court-ordered psy-
chiatric examination constitutes a confrontation to which the right of
counsel attaches under the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 64
Many factors inherent in a court-ordered psychiatric examination
contribute to the kind of potential substantial prejudice 165 against
which the sixth amendment right to counsel protects. 166 It is submitted
that the courts have given too little attention to the unreliability of
psychiatric judgments, 16' to the potential for prejudice and bias on the
part of psychiatrists, 168 and to the undue weight which tends to be
given to psychiatric testimony by the courts and juries, 169 all of which
may prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial. It is somewhat para-
doxical to note that, while courts have given great deference to psy-
chiatric testimony, and permit the psychiatrist to directly determine the
responsibility and punishability of the defendant, 170 the same courts.
have given little attention to the scholars in the psychiatric and medical




164. For a discussion of Wade, see notes 22-30 and accompanying text
supra. For the text of the sixth amendment, see note 3 supra.
165. For a discussion of such potential prejudice, see notes 97-136 and
accompanying text supra.
166. For the text of the sixth amendment, see note 3 supra.
167. For a discussion of the unreliability of psychiatric judgments, see
notes 101-26 and accompanying text supra.
168. For a discussion of prejudice and impartiality, see notes 114-20 and
accompanying text supra.
169. For a discussion of the undue weight given psychiatric testimony, see
notes 123-26 and accompanying text supra.
170. See Halleck, supra note 104, at 27-28. Halleck stated:
The psychiatrist is the only expert witness who is asked to present
opinions as to man's responsibility and man's punishability. The
toxicologist may testify as to the amount of poison in a victim's body
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professions who have expressed alarm at this reliance,171 especially in
view of the non-scientific foundation upon which psychiatric judgments
are based.172
On the other hand, some of the same courts have themselves ques-
tioned the reliability of psychiatric determinations and have bemoaned
the complexities of psychiatric theories and terminology 173 while refus-
ing to accept, as one way to combat the difficulties which these com-
plexities raise for the attorney cross-examining a court-appointed psy-
chiatrist at trial, the idea of allowing the defendant's attorney to be
present during the examination.
74
In considering, under the Wade analysis, counsel's ability to avoid
prejudice, it is submitted that the attorney's presence would afford the
attorney direct exposure to each bit of verbal and non-verbal com-
munication-each word and gesture in the examination-and give him a
first-hand factual basis upon which to cross-examine the psychiatrist at
trial. 75 Psychiatric reports, which are at present the attorney's only
pretrial source of information regarding the examination, provide an
inadequate basis for cross-examination since they are so conclusory as to
screen out most of what an attorney might attack as prejudicial or sug-
gestive. 76 Because of the unique character of the psychiatric examina-
tion-the many intangible and non-reportable factors present; the im-
portance of the specifics of verbal and non-verbal communication; and
and give an opinion as to whether it was sufficient to cause death.
The orthopedic surgeon testifies as to the degree of motor incapacita-
tion and its possible causes. The fingerprint or ballistics experts give
opinions which are strictly limited to their fields of competence. None
of these experts is ever asked to give an opinion as to the guilt or re-
sponsibility of the offender. Only the psychiatrist is asked to testify
and answer questions which go beyond his own training or com-
petence.
Id. The courts treat the psychiatric examination with extreme deference,
perhaps because the existence of diverse dogmatic schools of psychiatric thought,
underlying psychiatric opinion, which "often seem more like religious sects or
political parties" than scientific investigations. Meehl, Psychology and the
Criminal Law, 5 U. RIcH. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1970). The author claims that the
existence of such schools "makes the hard-headed lawyer suspicious as to their
scientific claims." Id. at 5.
171. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 128; Gray, supra note 124; Halleck,
supra note 104, at 27-28.
172. Id. For a discussion of the "non-scientific" nature of psychiatry, see
notes 101-20 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 102-09 and accompanying text supra.
174. See notes 31-72 and accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 153-63 and accompanying text supra.
176. For a discussion of the conclusory nature of such reports, see A.
,MATrHEWS, supra note 115, at 84; notes 123 & 159 supra.
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the need for detailed, factual, and first-hand information upon which.
to base effective cross-examination-it is submitted that the presence of
an attorney at a psychiatric examination is necessary to minimize or
avoid the inherent substantial prejudice to the defendant.
Furthermore, in considering whether the presence of an attorney
would have disruptive effects on the conduct of the examination, it is
suggested that the Supreme Court's observation in Wade that "to refuse-
to recognize the right to counsel for fear that counsel will obstruct the
course of justice is contrary to the basic assumptions upon which this
Court has operated in Sixth Amendment cases," 177 applies with equal
force in the context of psychiatric examinations. Curiously, the attor-
ney-an officer of the court-is considered by most courts to be an
intruder in a court-ordered psychiatric examination. 178 Stranger still,
at least one court has allowed a deputy marshall and a police guard to
be present during an examination, while excluding the defense attor-
ney. 179 It is submitted, however, that, whereas the presence of guards
is almost certainly disruptive and coercive, the presence of an attorney
need be no more disruptive at a psychiatric examination than it is at
a lineup, if the attorney is confined to the role of passive observer. 8 0
Moreover, it is suggested that the presence of a defense attorney is not
merely non-disruptive, but is in fact a positive influence, in that the
attorney's presence may increase the defendant's sense of security and
alleviate some of his suspicions and fears about psychiatric examination,
thereby contributing to an atmosphere more conducive to a successful
examination.
It is further submitted, as has been suggested by some courts,' 8 '
that video-taping of the examination may, in some cases, provide an
acceptable substitute for the actual presence of an attorney. It is sub-
mitted, however, that to be acceptable the video-taping must record all
aspects of the interview and accurately depict such factors as the en-
vironment in which the interview is conducted and the verbal and non-
verbal communication of both the defendant and the psychiatrist in
177. 388 U.S. at 237-38.
178. See notes 139-42 and accompanying text supra.
179. See United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d at 787. For a discussion of
Smith, see notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
180. See notes 73-76 &e 147 and accompanying text supra for the Lee
court's determination that the attorney should be a passive observer during
the examination. See note 148 supra for the view of the Houston court on
this issue.
181. See Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d at 695. For the view of the
Thornton court on this issue, see note 54 supra. See Houston v. State, 602'
P.2d at 784. For the view of the Houston court on this issue, see note 90.
supra. See People v. Larsen, 74 Ill. 2d at 363, 385 N.E.2d at 687 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). For Justice Clark's view on this issue, see note 66 supra.
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order to provide the absent attorney with a sound basis for preparing
for cross-examination of the psychiatrist at trial.
Although some courts have treated the psychiatric examination as
innocuous and non-adversarial, 8 2 the consequences of the psychiatric
determination are in fact far-reaching for the accused. If determined
to be incompetent to stand trial, the accused may nevertheless be in-
carcerated for an extended period of time in a unit for the criminally
insane 188 and will bear the stigma of being "criminally insane", a classi-
fication which can have crippling effects on rehabilitation. 84 If found
not guilty by reason of insanity, the accused will be involuntary com-
mitted to a state mental hospital unit for the criminally insane.'8
5
Most such hospital units are "inadequate" 186 and many of those sent
to hospitals for the criminally insane are retained for as long a period
or longer than they would have been if found guilty and sentenced for
the crimes they committed.
8 7
Despite these facts, at present only a few state courts 188 and no
federal courts of appeals 189 have recognized a constitutional right to
182. See notes 127-28 and accompanying text supra.
183. See Halleck, supra note 104, at 28. In addition to restricting free-
dom, facilities for the criminally insane are deplorably understaffed, thus im-
pairing the chance for recovery and lengthening the time until trial, a
deprivation, according to Halleck, of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Id. In addition, any time spent in the psychiatric facility prior to trial is not
subtracted from a sentence imposed on a defendant later found guilty at trial
and sentenced to. a prison term, leading to a type of "double jeopardy." Id.
184. Mullen 8 Norman, supra note 128, at 187. The authors noted:
Once individuals are placed in the forensic system they do not
easily get out, for the label "criminally insane" is not taken lightly by
others. A certain negative mystique lingers with discharged forensic
patients, a mystique that affects their return to family and community,
and, if later hospitalized in a general facility, may instigate an imme-
diate return to. a forensic facility with the label "dangerous." If
imprisoned, this same mystique may insure their eventual return to a
forensic psychiatric facility for treatment. Such circular events create
an air of hopelessness for these patients.
Id. at 187-88. Moreover, the authors asserted:
Often forensic patients appear to be in a no man's land between the
mental health and legal systems. Patients' constitutional rights to a
speedy trial by jury for their alleged offenses appear to be impaired
by such legal issues as competency to stand trial, effects of "mental
illness" on their responsibility for alleged offenses, as well as danger-
ousness as a criterion for continued involuntary hospitalization.
Id. at 188-89.
185. See Halleck, supra note 104, at 26.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 26-27.
188. See notes 73-94 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 31-55 and accompanying text supra.
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counsel during a court-ordered psychiatric examination. It is submitted
that the potentially grave impact such an examination may have on a
defendant and the mandate in Wade that pre-trial confrontations with
the defendant must be scrutinized for potential substantial prejudice
and potential alleviation of such prejudice by the presence of an attor-
ney 100 demand that criminal defendants be granted the sixth amend-
ment right to the presence of counsel during court-ordered psychiatric
examinations.
Roberta D. Pichini
190. See notes 22-30 and accompanying text supra.
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